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Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.*
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,' the United States
Supreme Court overturned a Seventh Circuit decision vacating an
arbitrator's punitive damage award against a securities broker.2 This case
arose from alleged mishandling of a securities account by the respondent. 3
Petitioners asserted a variety of state and federal causes of action in a
lawsuit filed in the Northern District of Illinois.4 Pursuant to the "Client's
Agreement" contract signed by petitioners Antonio and Diana
Mastrobuono, respondents moved to compel arbitration under sections 3
and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.5 The Client's Agreement6 allowed the
client to choose the procedural rules for the arbitration itself.7 The Client's
Agreement did not have an option for the choice of law. Any litigation or
arbitration was required to "be governed by the laws of the State of New
* 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
'Id.
2 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994).
3 Petitioners alleged that respondents had engaged in churning, unauthorized trading and
margin exposure. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Mastrobuono (No. 94-18). Churning occurs
when there is "excessive trading in a stock investment account in order to generate
commissions for a broker .... ." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (3d ed. 1991). As a result of
Respondent's alleged actions, Petitioners suffered "substantial losses." Petitioner's Brief at 6,
Mastrobuono (No. 94-18).
4 Petitioners alleged that respondent had violated: (I) SEC Rule lob-5 and § 15(c)(1) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (2) federal and state RICO statutes; (3) Illinois Securities
law and (4) Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. See Petitioner's
Brief at 6-9, Mastrobuono (No. 94-18). Petitioner also included common law claims for
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation and negligence. See id.
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
6 The relevant paragraph in the Client's Agreement states:
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of your [Shearson's] successors and assigns[,]
shall be binding on the undersigned, [Mastrobuonos'] heirs, executors, administrators
and assigns, and shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York. Unless
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to
[Mastrobuonos'] accounts, to transactions with you, your officers, directors, agents
and/or employees for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect, of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1216-1217 n.2.
7 The client was allowed to choose the arbitration rules from one of the three following
organizations: (1) the National Association of Securities Dealers, (2) the New York Stock
Exchange or (3) the American Stock Exchange.
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York." 8
Petitioners failed to specify which set of procedural rules should apply
in arbitration. 9 This allowed respondents to choose the National Association
of Securities Dealers' (NASD) procedural rules for the arbitration.10 The
parties arbitrated the dispute according to the procedural rules of the NASD
and the substantive law of New York. 11 After hearing all evidence, the
arbitration panel awarded $159,327 in compensatory damages and $400,000
in punitive damages to petitioners. 12
Respondents contested the punitive damages award in the Northern
District of Illinois, claiming that the arbitration panel had exceeded its
power. Respondents did not contest the compensatory damage award and
promptly paid the $159,327 compensatory damage award. 13 Noting that the
parties had agreed to follow New York law, the district court held that the
arbitrators had exceeded their authority. 14 New York provides that only
courts may grant punitive damages. Arbitrators are expressly forbidden
from awarding punitive damages. 15 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision. 16 The Supreme Court granted Certiorari 17 in order to
address the split among the circuits18 on the power of choice of law
8 Mastrobuono v. Sherson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
9 SeeMasirobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217.
10 See id.at 1218.
11 See id.
12 See Petitioner's Brief at 10, Mastrobuono (No. 94-18).
13 See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215.
14 See Mastrobuono, 812 F. Supp at 848.
15 See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (1976).
16 See Masrobuono, 20 F.3d at 713.
17 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 305 (1994).
18 The circuits were split into two groups before the Mastrobuono decision. One group
of circuits deferred to the parties' choice of law clause and disallowed punitive damages. This
group included the Second and Seventh Circuits. See, e.g., Barbier v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991); Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742
F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984).
The second group of circuits held that punitive damages were available regardless of the
parties' choice of law. These circuits held that the FAA preempted state law on the issue of
punitive damages. These circuits included the First, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. See,
e.g., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1990); Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); W'lloughby Roofing and
Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985). For detailed comparison of
these cases, see Heather J. Haase, Note, In Defense of Parties' Rights to Limit Arbitral
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provisions to preclude an arbitral award of punitive damages that would
otherwise be proper. 19
The Supreme Court held by a vote of 8-1 that the contract was
ambiguous on the issue of punitive damages. Under existing precedent,
ambiguities in the contract are read in favor of arbitration. 20 As such, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Client's Agreement as allowing punitive
damages. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University,21 the primary background case, is factually
similar to Mastrobuono. In Volt, Stanford University brought action against
a contractor for fraud and breach of contract. 22 The contract included an
arbitration clause which mandated arbitration under the law of "the place
where the Project is located." 23 In this case, the project took place in
California, therefore California law was used. Under California law, any
party may stay arbitration when the litigation involves parties who are not
subject to the arbitration. 24
Volt moved to compel arbitration under California arbitration law. 2s
California law did not permit arbitration when the case involved parties who
had not consented to arbitration. Based on this, the California Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling refusing to compel arbitration. 26
The California Supreme Court denied review of this case. 27
The United States Supreme Court upheld the California Court of
Appeals. The California Court of Appeals held that the parties had intended
to use California arbitration law.28 The United States Supreme Court relied
on the California court's interpretation of the contract because "the
interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state
Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
31 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 309, 322-330 (1996).
19 See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215.
20 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (holding that section 2 of the FAA requires that "any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration").
21 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
22 See id. at 470.
23 Id. at 472.
24 See id. at 471 (citing CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982)).
25 See id.
26 See id.
2 7 See Id. at 473.
28 Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed strongly with this assessment. Arguing that
interpretation of arbitration clauses intertwined federal and state law, these dissenting Justices
felt that the Supreme Court should be able to review the lower court decision. See id. at 487-
488.
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law .... " 29 Thus, the question in Volt involved the power of parties to set
the rules of the arbitration through a choice of law clause.
The Supreme Court held that parties can choose the substantive laws
and rules for an arbitration through a choice of law clause. The Court based
this decision on the proposition that the primary purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act is to enable parties to enforce arbitration agreements
according to their terms. Thus, if parties wish to use the laws of a specific
jurisdiction, arbitrators and courts are obligated to use the laws of that
jurisdiction. "Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will
arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that
arbitration will be conducted. "30
Volt provided the backdrop for the Mastrobuono case. Volt established
that courts are obligated to enforce choice of law clauses in arbitration
agreements. The Supreme Court, although using the same law as in Volt,
came up with a very different result. In an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court held
that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous regarding the power of the
arbitration panel to award punitive damages. Justice John Paul Stevens
wrote the opinion for the majority and Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the
dissenting opinion.
At first blush, it does not appear that the Supreme Court created any
new law in this area. The Court relied on existing precedents and common
law doctrines in order to decide this case. The Court rejected petitioners
request that the Federal Arbitration Act be extended to pre-preempt all state
arbitration law, even when the parties have chosen that state's laws by
contract. 31 The Court felt that the "central purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act [is] to ensure 'that private agreements to arbitrate are
enforced according to their terms.'" 32 Therefore, if the parties agreed to
limit arbitration by using New York law, the courts are required to enforce
that agreement. 33
The rest of the Court's opinion was a de novo 34 examination of whether
29 Id. at 474.
30 Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
31 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (holding
that the FAA preempts all state law on the issue of arbitrability).
3 2 Masirobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1214 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
33 See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216 ("In other words, if the contract says 'no
punitive damages,' that is the end of the matter, for courts are bound to interpret contracts in
accordance with the expressed intentions of the parties-even if the effect of those intentions is
to limit arbitration.").
3 4 See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217 n.4. This contrasts with the situation in Volt,
where the Supreme Court granted deference to the California Court of Appeal's interpretation
of the contract. See id.; supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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the parties agreed to exclude punitive damages. After exploring the contract
clause, New York law and the NASD rules, the Court concluded that the
contract was ambiguous on the issue of punitive damages. This ambiguity
arose from a conflict between the choice of law provision and a handbook
given to NASD arbitrators. The Court felt that a clause in the handbook
indicated that NASD arbitrators were allowed to award punitive damages.
The clause in question states that "[tihe issue of punitive damages may arise
with great frequency in arbitrations. Parties to arbitration are informed that
arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy."Is
This statement led the Court to find that the text of the arbitration
clause does not indicate that the parties had chosen to rule out punitive
damages. "Mhe text of the arbitration clause itself surely does not support
-indeed, it contradicts-the conclusion that the parties agreed to foreclose
claims for punitive damages." 36 At best, the Court felt that the arbitration
clause was ambiguous as to the role of punitive damages. There were no
relevant NASD procedural rules that prevented punitive damages.37
Once the Court determined that the arbitration clause was ambiguous,
the Court used two common law doctrines of contract interpretation. The
first doctrine was construing ambiguous language against the drafter. The
purpose of this rule is to protect a party who did not draft a document from
unintended or unfair results.38 The Court argued that this purpose is
particularly relevant to this case. The petitioners signed a standard form
contract in which they implicitly waived their right to punitive damages.
The second common law rule of contract interpretation that the
Supreme Court used is the doctrine of reading a document to give effect to
all provisions and render them consistent with each other.39 As such, the
Supreme Court interpreted the choice of law provision as incorporating all
substantive New York law except for New York's laws which limit the
authority of arbitrators. The arbitration clause incorporates the NASD rules
3 5 Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1218.
3 6 1d.
37 The NASD has since amended its rules on punitive damages. Rule 21(0(4) of the
NASD Rules of Fair Practice now reads "[n]o agreement [between a member and a customer]
shall include any condition which ... limits the ability of a party to file lany claim in
arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitrators to make any award." Masirobuono, 115 S.
Ct. at 1218 n.6. This rule went into effect for contracts executed after September 7, 1989. See
id.
38 See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 206 cmt.a (1979)).
39 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) & cmt. b (1979),
other citations omitted).
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of arbitration, including the purported allowance of punitive damages. 4°
Finally, the majority relied on the doctrine that any "ambiguities as to
the scope of the arbitration clause itself [must be] resolved in favor of
arbitration." 4 1 Thus, the majority argued that when there is ambiguity as to
the power of arbitrators to grant punitive damages, courts are obligated to
allow arbitrators to exercise those powers.
The Court's analysis of the Client's Agreement is flawed. As Justice
Thomas pointed out in his lone dissent, this handbook was not a part of the
NASD procedural rules for arbitration. In fact, the handbook was not
promulgated by the NASD at all. It was created by the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA). 42 In other words, the majority relied on
a handbook created by a separate organization, 43 and treated that handbook
as acting as precedent.
The majority also misrepresented the nature of the handbook itself. The
handbook was an instructional manual which offered suggestions about how
NASD arbitrators should conduct themselves during arbitrations.44
Moreover, the Supreme Court engaged in selective editing of the
handbook's statement about punitive damages. The complete statement from
the handbook follows:
The issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in
arbitrations. Parties to arbitration are informed that arbitrators can
consider punitive damages as a remedy. Generally, in court proceedings,
punitive damages consist of compensation in excess of actual damages and
are awarded as a form of punishment against the wrongdoer. If punitive
damages are awarded, the decision of the arbitrators should clearly
40 See id.
41 Id. at 1218 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 476; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 See id. at 1222 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing SECURrIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE
ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL (1992) [hereinafter SICA ARBITRATOR'S
MANUAL]).
43 One commentator has argued that Congress has implicitly delegated rulemaking
authority to SICA. That commentator's argument is premised on the notion that to the extent
that the SEC has consented to the SICA's interpretation of an arbitrators right to give punitive
damages, SICA is persuasive authority. See Denise M. Barton, Comment, The Evolution of
Punitive Damage Awards in Securities Arbitration: Has the Use of Punitive Damages
Rendered the Arbitration Forum Inequitable?, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1537, 1546 (1996).
44 Justice Thomas pointed out a number of examples which demonstrate the true nature
of the handbook. For instance, the handbook suggested that arbitrators maintain a "poker
face" during questioning of a witness. See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1222 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Also, the handbook recommended that the arbitrator should not permit "shouting,
profanity or gratuitious remarks ...." Id. at 1222 n.3 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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specify what portion of the award is intended as punitive damages, and the
arbitrators should consider referring to the authority on which they
relied.
45
The handbook actually stated that the arbitrator should cite to authority
when punitive damages were awarded and should specify what amount of
the award was for punitive damages. When read in context, the handbook
belied the notion that the arbitrator had the inherent power to grant punitive
damages.
What is most notable about this case is what it does not do. First and
foremost, this case does not wholly extinguish state law on arbitration.
Petitioners had requested that the Supreme Court, in essence, hold that
courts can not enforce choice of law clauses in arbitration agreements. The
Supreme Court refused to do this. The Court chose instead to enforce the
choice of law clause, because that was what the parties had agreed to. Then
the Court engaged in very creative contract analysis to find ambiguity where
none really existed.
At first blush, this case appears to have little or no precedential effect. 46
Justice Thomas argued that this case was only binding on this specific
agreement. "This case amounts to nothing more than a federal court
applying Illinois and New York contract law to an agreement between
parties .... [Tihe majority's interpretation of the contract represents only
the understanding of a single federal court regarding the requirements
imposed by state law. " 47 Justice Thomas was incorrect on the impact of this
case.
Justice Thomas did not recognize that this case would be applied to
other contracts with similar language. In fact, most securities brokerage
firms have similar choice of law provisions.48 There have already been a
number of cases in which courts have upheld the awarding of punitive
damage awards against securities brokerage houses solely on the basis that
the language in the arbitration agreement was identical or virtually identical
to the language in Mastrobuono's arbitration. 49 So long as aggrieved
plaintiffs bring their claim in federal court, it is impossible for securities
4 5 Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1222 (quoting SICA ARBrRATOR's MANUAL, supra note
42, at 21).
46 But see Richard A. Booth, Punitive Damages and Securities Arbitration in the Wake
ofMastrobuono, 9 INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEc. L. ADVISOR 20, 20 (1995).
4 7 Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
4 8 See Paul Lansing & John D. Bailey, The Future of Punitive Damage Awards in
Securities Arbitration Cases After Mastrobuono, 8 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 201, 220 (1996).
49 See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 1995); Smith
Barney, Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1995); Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1050,
1055 (10th Cir. 1995); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193 (D. Mass. 1995).
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dealers to avoid punitive damages through a choice of law clause. 50
The other impact is more subtle. The Court is sending a message to
contract drafters and lower courts. That message is that courts should
rigorously examine any contract that limits damages that an arbitrator may
award through a choice of law provision. In other words, if the parties want
to exclude punitive damages, they should clearly state their intention to do
so. At least one circuit has expressly stated that Mastrobuono requires that
arbitrators have the power to award punitive damages unless the parties
unequivocally state otherwise. 5 1 As mentioned above, Mastrobuono has the
effect of leaving state law alive. Parties may still choose to use the
arbitration law of a specific state. This presents a danger that, thus far, has
remained unmentioned. The Court has recently made it clear that all state
arbitration law is preempted by the FAA. 52
The Mastrobuono case demonstrated that there is one exception to this
rule. Where the parties used a choice of law provision, that state's law will
continue to be used. Because state law appears to be wholly preempted by
the FAA, there is very little chance that state law that is on the books will
be changed. Because there will almost never be a case arising in state court
under a choice of law clause, there is little chance that state courts will
overturn out-dated cases. State legislatures will be unlikely to amend their
state arbitration laws, because the new laws will not have any effect. This
leads to the danger.
Sophisticated parties can continue to incorporate unfavorable arbitration
law into a contract through a choice-of-law clause. This problem will only
become worse as the laws become older and more archaic. As a result, it is
likely that archaic and out-dated arbitration laws will continue to remain on
the books. The sole effect of these laws will be that sophisticated contract
writers will be able to use these laws as a trap for the unwary.
Henry Gamble Appel
50 In 1989, the NASD revised its "Rules of Fair Practice" to prohibit members from
limiting "the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or [limiting] the ability of the
arbitrators to make any award." Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1218 n.6 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). This rule only applied to contracts executed after September 7,
1989. For contracts executed after this date, there will be a clear discrepancy between NASD
rules and the choice of law clause on the ability of arbitrators to award punitive damages.
Mastrobuono will assure that arbitrators have the power to award punitive damages for these
contracts as well.
51 See Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
999 (5th Cir. 1995).
52 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (holding that the
FAA extends to the limits of the Commerce Clause).
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